Saturday, January 27, 2018

Post 3: Winking Through The Illusion(ism)

This last week we studied various kinds of "realism" in performance. Goffman and Orenstein helped us question the reality of everyday interactions. The Naturalism history helped situate the style of extreme illusionism on stage. The Underiner reading told of a performance that seeks (sort of) to "put you there" in the middle of an experience that is all-too-real for many people.


Quick review: naturalism strives to create the illusion of "real life" on stage while hiding the mechanisms behind that illusion. The lighting instruments, the struts the keep the flats upright, the jury-rigged "plumbing" that makes the kitchen sink on stage appear to work, the elaborate acting technique that makes characters' actions and reactions appear unrehearsed, even the climactic dramaturgical structure that keeps the plot clear and interesting--all of these get muted or masked. Ideally, in a naturalistic production, no one in the audience is consciously aware of these technical elements; spectators get absorbed (more or less) into the illusion.

The Caminata Nocturna (the border-crossing reenactment event Underiner writes about), by contrast, seemed to dance back and forth between "you're totally in this reality" and "we're pausing to comment/reflect on this reality." Such moments of pause-and-think recall the work of Bertolt Brecht and company.. We'll read Brecht a bit later in this class, but for now (spoilers!), Brecht and co. distrusted the absorption-into-illusion of naturalism and reacted against the labor necessary to maintain that illusion. Indeed, theirs is a theatre of disillusionment. They sought to strip away the veil of "just like life" artifice in dramaturgy and production--showing the lighting instruments, foregrounding the artificiality of the stage, disrupting naturalistic acting styles, interrupting the smooth line of a Freytag plot. Through such dramaturgical and production choices, Brecht and company sought to undermine the ideology of "it just happens this way; there's nothing you can do" that keeps oppressive social systems firmly in place. Where naturalism wants to catch you up in the swift current of plot and character, Brecht and co.--and to a certain extent the Caminata producers--want you to start swimming against the current, questioning character choices and narrative arcs.

For this post, think of some occasion (ideally one you've experienced or witnessed) in which a performance of some sort was "too real" and had to have some kind of intervention/addition/change to interrupt the illusion and make it not quite as problematically real.

Let me give you an example or two of the kind of thing I'm thinking of. First, as we noted in class, most straight play acting styles in the US derive from Stanislavski, aiming at a naturalistic sense of the character as a real, living person speaking, acting, and reacting organically and spontaneously and not an actor reciting pre-written lines and moving in pre-planned ways. In this sense, talking about a "too real" performance seems odd. Can an actor be "too real" when realism is the point?

Well, yes.

Although on one level an actor should seem to be authentically living in the imaginary circumstances of the play, on another simultaneous level the actor has to be aware that she's an actor playing for a live audience in a theatre. She must cheat out, project, enunciate, adhere to blocking, account for technical elements, stick to the dialogue of the script, and do a hundred other things that no actual person does in everyday life. Actors who fail to remember to do these not-quite-real things, however, get quick correction: "We can't see you!" "We can't hear you!" "You can't just ad lib; the next cue depends on this line as written!" All of these would be examples of interventions we make into stage realism, alterations to the illusion that make the acting less "real" for the sake of theatrical convention.

Another, not formally theatrical example of "too real" would be instances of parody or irony. A friend of mine, Kelly Howe, writes about how performances like these run the risk of seeming too real. (Witness, for example, occasions where a headline from the parody news site The Onion gets recirculated as authentic.) Without some kind of "wink" or nod to the audience--a breaking of the illusion of "this is real"--a parody might be taken as the thing it seeks to make fun of. Online (and especially in cases where the parody skewers extreme conservative/religious views), this kind of phenomenon is known as "Poe's Law," which in its original formulation goes like this: Absent some kind of obvious signal, a parody of religious fundamentalism is indistinguishable from an authentic expression of religious fundamentalism.

Can you think of other occasions where a performance of some sort was "too real"? What kind of alteration/addition--a "wink" to the audience of sorts--was necessary to fix the "too real" performance (or what kind of changes would have helped, if any)?

Thursday, January 25, 2018

Summary for Post 2

Greetings, all--

I'm so pleased with all the posts this round. Here's a digest:



Dharmik mentions Colin Kaepernick’s kneeling for the national anthem (an act that perhaps recalls and plays on Tim Tebow’s kneeling). I think that’s an excellent example. Kaepernick apparently got the idea from a war vet, who suggested kneeling as a respectful mode of dissent. In this light, kneeling is still a gesture of homage—but with a slant, a marked difference from the norm. You could certainly frame the huge debate/conversation/movement that sprang up in response as a performative result of Kaepernick’s gesture. Dharmik also poses some ethical questions about how we as actors rely on and play into gender norms. Check it out.

Mark relates an act of minor defacement of a stop-sign (from “STOP” to “STOP eating animals”), one that with subsequent modifications became a mini-conversation about social messages, vandalism, and parody. (As you’ll see the theme of parody and ironic commentary is a running theme across many posts.) Fun stuff. Also we learn that Mark has a thing against bran muffins.

Erica shares an awesome story (with pics and videos) of her mom protesting Vice-President Pence. She’s part of a protest where participants wear costumes from the television adaptation of The Handmaid’s Tale. A dystopian scenario of a near-future where fertile women are enslaved and their reproductive freedom denied, Handmaid’s Tale gets invoked in this protest as both warning (this is what could happen here) and denunciation (it better not happen here). I mean, this isn’t LARP-ing, right? The protesters aren’t doing cosplay as fans; they’re occupying and re-directing the signifier of “handmaiden” as a loud, rambunctious (scholar Sara Ahmed would call it “willful”) protest. Awesome!

Mike gives us a couple of different examples from pop culture—Dos Equis commercials to Spaceballs, with Adam Sandler in between. The Sandler, of course, is the movie I Now Pronounce You Chuck and Larry, where Sandler and Kevin James play uber-straight guys who get married to reap the benefits of marriage—all while maintaining the stereotypical straight male’s disgust/fear of being seen as gay (or “like a woman,” really—there’s a famous saying to the effect of “homophobia = misogyny in drag”). So—on the one hand this is a film that plays on gay panic, i.e., the dramatic irony of “people think they’re gay—but they’re totally not!!! HILARIOUS.” It likely does so while also insisting that it’s really about tolerance (we’re just being ironic, we have sympathetic gay characters, the protagonists learn to be accepting, the comedy pokes fun at “real” homophobes, etc.). But in another way, the plot also unintentionally echoes some critiques launched by various queer theorists (including Butler) about what we gain and lose when “gay marriage” becomes the be-all/end-all for LGBTQ political action. Legal marriage in the USA confers a great many benefits (insurance, tax breaks, green cards, etc.). That is, a great many life-enhancing benefits in the USA require that you be married in order to access them easily. If I have a chronic illness but crappy health insurance, why wouldn’t I want to get fake-married to a willing spouse with excellent insurance and spousal benefits? Or, more deeply, why should legal marriage be a prerequisite for life-and-death things like health care, citizenship, pension, and so forth? In presenting marriage as a cynical ploy for benefits, in other words, the movie could be seen as criticizing why the state sees fit to restrict multiple life-enhancing benefits to those who get married. Chuck and Larry aren’t misusing marriage. By turning marriage into an entry ticket for a world of benefits (benefits that, in a better society, everyone would enjoy), the US has already turned marriage into a cynical affair of elite privilege. At least—that’d be a possible queer reading of the film.

Andréa gives a cool, informed reading of a famous statue commemorating the “foot soldiers” of the civil rights era. The subject of the photograph on whom the statue is based objects to the way he and his image have been mythologized into something he’s not. Andréa links this artistic mythologization to Suzan-Lori Park’s description of her historical plays as “re-membering” history, making the past live and breathe in the present. Yet no representation of the past—on stage, on the page, or in art—is a perfect recreation. “History” is the story (the plot, really) we tell about past events, not the past events themselves. That’s not to say that there are some histories more accurate/reliable than others or that the actual past doesn’t matter. But it is to point out that every historian or artist who re-members the past has a filter operating about what to include, what to exclude, what to focus on, and how to arrange/present it. The writing of history (historiography) is a performative act. As such, it reiterates the past in ways that alter slightly (or greatly) the “actual” past. Think about that whenever you encounter a play about the past.

In a similar vein, I highly recommend Sarah’s post about past and present moments of protest, oppression, and freedom in Uganda and South Africa. She combines a reading of her relative’s nostalgia for a past (even though, from a present POV that past was defined by oppressive/colonialist dynamics) with a reading of some present-day students’ dissatisfaction with how the present has failed to live up to past revolutionary promises. Sarah writes, “Butler makes the observation that freedom is created and exists within the moment of its manifestation – but this does not mean that a manifested freedom is a successful one.” It’s complicated to try to summarize; read it for yourself.

Lisa solidifies the popularity of Spaceballs among this MFA class, providing an in-depth reading of how Mel Brooks tweaks various archetypes in George Lucas’s original. Given that Lucas intends many of his images to invoke/recall specific historical/cultural realities, Brooks’s tweaking necessarily tweaks those realities. Brooks, of course, is no stranger to tweaking cultural/historical icons; witness Springtime for Hitler. Lisa makes me curious, though, about what it might mean to bypass Star Wars iconography in favor of Spaceballs when painting, say, our current president as an evil overlord. Presenting Trump (or any sitting President) as Darth Vader is one thing; presenting a president as Dark Helmet is another.

Emily relates a different kind of tweak—Monty Python’s tweak of the passion narrative in The Life of Bryan. I hadn’t known about the movie’s history or its subsequent controversy. Fascinating. If you’re interested, scholar Henry Bial recently wrote a book called Playing God (available online from our library). There he chronicles the surprisingly dicey history of Broadway plays that portray God as a character. It used to be flat-out illegal to do so and still remains a vexed gesture. He points out that, in presenting a God (or Jesus), you’re not just making a joke; you’re making a theological statement. I wonder, is this can’t-help-but-be-bigger-than-you-intend quality present in other kinds of representation?

Austin references Borat, specifically the part where Sacha Baron Cohen’s character attends a rodeo and sings—not “The Star-Spangled Banner” but—what the movie portrays as the Kazakh national anthem (a parody creation, of course, with lyrics about how much potassium the nation produces and how clean its prostitutes are). The movie was widely praised (91% on Rotten Tomatoes); most of the lawsuits against it by duped parties portrayed in the film were dismissed. It’s worth noting, however, that in his pursuit of a sly critique of USAmerican culture/views/values (including racism, homophobia, and xenophobia), Cohen angered not just Americans but also actual people from Kazakhstan. Now, I’m sure the creators of Borat did not intend any real offense. But, as we’ve discussed, representation’s effects don’t always align with our best intentions. In 2012, a Kazakh woman, Mariya Dmitriyenko, won the Amir of Kuwait International Shooting Grand Prix (a sports shooting event). Standing on the platform during the ceremony, she was dismayed to hear not her country’s anthem but the Borat parody (which the event’s organizers had accidentally downloaded). The ceremony was restaged with the right anthem. As we’ve seen with the other parodic tweaks, irony’s a tricky animal. It always runs the risk of being missed, taken at face value rather than as a tongue-in-cheek gesture.  

That's it for this week! Keep the posts and comments comin'.

John

Thursday, January 18, 2018

Post 2: Performativity!

From performance to performativity and back!

Some mind-bending stuff this week, no?

We read about a performative act as an expression that does or accomplishes something beyond describing or referring to something else.

We read about how performative utterances aren't true or false but felicitous or infelicitous--they work or they don't work based on the context, the person uttering it, etc.

We read, finally, about how performative acts--the conscious and unconscious habits and actions we do every day--can help to create a sense of self, a sense of gender, a sense of identity. From "It's a girl! Let's buy pink" to "Ladies don't sit like that" to "You make me feel like a natural woman"--our sense of who we are (masculine, feminine, queer, straight, bi, trans-, cis-, Methodist, Hindu, Atheist, Vegan, ginger, whatever) comes from a lifetime of repeated acts that performatively consolidate a sense of gender identity and sexuality.

But, Butler says, if identity is based on performances, then that opens the possibility that we may perform differently than expected. We can change or alter (or, to use the verb form, we can queer) performative acts in ways that undermine or subvert how they're "supposed" to be performed. She links this performing-differently to performances of citizenship, such as the instance of protesters singing the USAmerican national anthem in Spanish.

For this week's post, I want you to describe or link to an example of someone tweaking a performative act or utterance to mean/do something other than it's originally supposed to. If I pledge allegiance to the American flag, that's one thing (I pledge allegiance by reciting the words, "I pledge allegiance..."). If I recite that pledge, however, as I salute--say--the flag of the evil Galactic Empire from Star Wars--then I'm doing something else, perhaps suggesting that the U.S. is like the Galactic Empire (note: I'm just using an example here, not actually making that suggestion. I could just as easily use the flag of Equestria from My Little Pony: Friendship is Magic).

Something similar happens if I tweak (queer?) a famously patriotic action captured in art, like Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima (as the pics I've included here do). Note how these tweaks could be taken in a number of ways: funny, clever, disrespectful, or offensive.

Aside from your standard "reflect/discuss stuff from this week," give me the example of a performative act/utterance intentionally performed to mean something else. Then explain your example. Reflect on if/how that intentional misperformance could be interpreted in contradictory ways.

Post by Tuesday.

See y'all in class!

JF

Summary for Post I



Hey, all—

Thanks for your amazing posts! There’s a lot here, so let me get to it.

Andréa seizes on the notion that performance is “scripted” behavior. Chatting with a friend, drinking some water, and petting a dog, she wonders what script if any they and the dog are performing. States (I think it’s him?—I’ll need to check) somewhere mentions that it’s tricky to describe pets and children as performing. Onstage (as I’m sure you all know), most pets and very young children (e.g., toddlers, infants) draw focus. They are, semiotically speaking, disruptions. Why? States guesses it’s because they are only, obviously themselves. They cannot engage in mimetic behavior (at least, not at the level dictated by formal stage conventions). At some level, the audience knows that they’re out of control. We hope the kid will behave; we hope the dog will go through its assigned tricks. But, audiences realize, there’s no guarantee this will be the case. The same kind of out-of-control fascination occurs with elements like fire or water on stage. They’re unpredictable—unscriptable—in ways that put pressure on the other elements on stage. Cool stuff, really. For your enjoyment: here’s MarinaAbramovic drinking water.

Andréa’s subsequent post on “felicity conditions” is appreciated.

Emily, in grappling with the notion that everything is performance, reminds me of a helpful distinction Schechner makes in the “What is Performance” optional reading I gave you. Namely, Schechner talks about two different conversations or avenues of inquiry we can take. We can, on the one hand, talk about something (an event, a phenomenon) like it is (unquestionably is) performance. Alternately, we can talk about something as (“as if it were”) performance. Performance, in other words, can be a conceptual box into which we put certain kinds of events. Or it can be a lens that we can peer through to examine events in a new light (the light of “what if we looked at this as a performance?”). The is/as distinction takes some of the pressure off of our having to have utterly certain definitions. Emily also distinguishes sports from performance by invoking the notion of the fictitious. Theatrical performances are fictitious; sports are real. It’s a rule of thumb that makes sense, but of course I’m going to throw a monkeywrench into the gears. The term fiction, after all, doesn’t mean untrue or without substance or consequence; it just means manufactured—crafted by someone. In this sense, football is both real (bones get broken, traumatic brain injuries happen, teams win and lose) and fictitious. Football is, in some sense, an arbitrary set rules for behavior that are “real” only because everyone involved consents to treat them seriously, suspending their disbelief in the ostensible silliness of the endeavor. (Of course, one can use that description for just about any human enterprise. Can you think of any exceptions?)

Sarah gives us a fascinating metaphor of theatre and performance as, respectively, the upper and middle classes of a kingdom. (What, I wonder, would the lower classes be? Porn acting? Mime? Prop comedy?) Theatre, she offers, operates as “a series of previously defined actions guided by an undisputed manual.” Performance, on the other hand, is “continuously defined behavior which seeks to dispute this single standard of operation.” Rather quickly, though, Sarah problematizes this distinction, pointing out how the boundaries between these two realms defines a zone of conflict. Performance constantly drifts into standardized, conventional practice; theatre attempts to push its boundaries by incorporating performance elements. The description of this battle—which Sarah frames as being vital to the kingdom’s survival—is fascinating.

Osi helpfully brings in Schechner’s distinction between “make-believe” and “make-belief” performance. Some kinds of performance (conventional theatre, LARPing, children playing) aim to create a space of “make-believe,” where participants conjoin imaginations to create and sustain a “what if” world or scenario. Other kinds of performance are “make-belief”—structured and even scripted, to be sure, but taken seriously and not separated from the rest of life in terms of consequence and seriousness. The presidency is Schechner’s example here. Various kinds of cultural and religious ritual might fit here. As Osi points out, these two realms have a lot of overlap. Can you think of times where you thought you were participating in one realm (make-belief/make-believe) only to end up in the other?

Austin provides a nice review of the elements of performance outlined by Carlson before turning to the sports/theatre distinction. For Austin, the crucial distinction is that in a sporting event, the participants aren’t clear on the conclusion in the same way that actors in a play are. (Of course, there are plays such as The Mystery of Edwin Drood that defy this convention.) Austin ends with an intriguing question about professional wrestling, a practice that challenges a lot of our conversations about theatre versus sports. (Neal Hebert, a recent PhD graduate of ours, wrote his dissertation on professional wrestling. He knows a lot about it.)

Two notions from Mike’s post catch my attention. First, he suggests a distinction between theatre and theater. The -re describes the craft/discipline; the -er describes the physical space. This reminds me of one of the first practical lessons I got in theatre, way back during a production of Chess (the other ABBA musical) at the Shawnee (Oklahoma) Little Theatre. I was a little high school junior, playing five or six different ensemble parts, and an older (like, 22 years old) theatre major from Oklahoma Baptist University, who was playing a bigger role, schooled me on pronunciation and syllabic emphasis. THEE-a-ter, she counseled, was this thing we’re doing, whereas the-A-ter was that place you go to watch movies. It was clear from her manner which one was preferable. In my mind, I’ve always pasted those pronunciations on the two different spellings. The other idea Mike brings up is that of obligatory performances, or performances under stress. Mike refers to occasions where you have to make an excuse to someone—a parent, a spouse, a teacher—and you engage in some “acrobatic” storytelling (even if you’re not, strictly speaking, lying). We’ll be talking more about performances under stress later in the semester.

Mark mentions a kind of performance-under-stress: his son’s request to play video games. As Mark points out, all performances depend upon contexts for their significance and meaning. Theatre’s only real distinction from performance, ultimately, is the standardized, conventional nature of its particular context. (Note how vital contexts are for performative acts, as well.) Of course, when there’s a lack of agreement or confusion about context, things can go awry See this example from The Naked Gun.
Can you think of real-world occasions where this kind of confusion has occurred?

Erica relates her experience of devising and performing her “Vocal History” assignment in (Stacy’s?) class, relating the various different kinds of voice she’s developed for different sets of contexts and audiences. It’s a cool example of the “not-me” and “not-not-me” and of how differential pressures can move us (oblige us?) to innovate our personal performances. Erica writes, “I cannot think of a moment in my life when I have been truly alone and had the same sense of performance as I have had in the instances I mentioned above.” This makes me wonder if and how we perform when we think we’re alone. Are we ever really separated from performance contexts, from the visible and invisible pressures that impel us to perform? When, in other words, might we be not performing? When might we be “just me”?

In her post, Lisa centers us on questions of purpose: what’s performance/theatre for? The purpose, as she states, will dictate our choices. She’s fascinated by occasions where intention and reception (or, as she puts it, “expectation and fruition”) differ. There’s always a risk with performance, right? One theatre scholar, Peggy Phelan (in her amazing book Unmarked: The Politics of Performance), reminds us that representation (and thus performance) follows two laws: “(i) it always conveys more than it intends, and (ii) it is never totalizing” (2). There’s a surplus and a deficit in every act of representation, a little wiggle room of both “I didn’t mean that” and “but I thought that’s what I just said.” This wiggle room can be a source of frustration (as when your audience just doesn’t get it, or when—worse—they see something offensive/bad in your performance that you didn’t intend at all). But it can also be a source of energy and joy. It’s the potential for the new/unexpected that makes representation/performance/theatre so dynamic. It’s this never-quite-exact Murphy’s Law of representation that gives theorists like Judith Butler hope. We’ll talk more about this later in class.

In his musings on the theatre/sports distinction, Dharmik mentions that theatre often intends to teach as well as entertain. There’s a venerable history in western theatre of theorists and practitioners (starting at least with Horace) saying that theatre’s twin purposes are “to teach and to please.” There have been variations on this throughout history (e.g., Antonio Minturno arguing, “teach, please, and persuade”; Lodovico Castelvetro saying “just entertain”). As a bit of arts advocacy, though, “teach and please” isn’t bad, is it? Would you say that theatre follows those aims? Should it? Dharmik also mentions the kind of personas that athletes often have. That’s a fascinating idea, the persona. How is a persona different than or similar to a character? Can you think of examples where the two blur into each other (off the top of my head: Mr. Rogers, Bill Nye the Science Guy, Mr. T)?

That’s all my thinks for now. Feel free to comment/elaborate either here or on your own (or others’) blogs. Do read/comment on each other’s blogs, and look for the prompt for Post 2 soon!

Best,

John