This last week we studied various kinds of "realism" in performance. Goffman and Orenstein helped us question the reality of everyday interactions. The Naturalism history helped situate the style of extreme illusionism on stage. The Underiner reading told of a performance that seeks (sort of) to "put you there" in the middle of an experience that is all-too-real for many people.
Quick
review: naturalism strives to create the illusion of "real life" on
stage while hiding the mechanisms behind that illusion. The lighting
instruments, the struts the keep the flats upright, the jury-rigged
"plumbing" that makes the kitchen sink on stage appear to work, the
elaborate acting technique that makes characters' actions and reactions
appear unrehearsed, even the climactic dramaturgical structure that
keeps the plot clear and interesting--all of these get muted or masked.
Ideally, in a naturalistic production, no one in the audience is
consciously aware of these technical elements; spectators get absorbed
(more or less) into the illusion.
The Caminata Nocturna (the border-crossing reenactment event Underiner writes about), by contrast, seemed to dance back and forth between "you're totally in this reality" and "we're pausing to comment/reflect on this reality." Such moments of pause-and-think recall the work of Bertolt Brecht and company.. We'll read Brecht a bit later in this class, but for now (spoilers!), Brecht and co. distrusted the absorption-into-illusion of naturalism and reacted against the labor necessary to maintain that illusion. Indeed, theirs is a theatre of disillusionment.
They sought to strip away the veil of "just like life" artifice in
dramaturgy and production--showing the lighting instruments,
foregrounding the artificiality of the stage, disrupting naturalistic
acting styles, interrupting the smooth line of a Freytag plot. Through
such dramaturgical and production choices, Brecht and company sought to
undermine the ideology of "it just happens this way; there's nothing you
can do" that keeps oppressive social systems firmly in place. Where
naturalism wants to catch you up in the swift current of plot and
character, Brecht and co.--and to a certain extent the Caminata producers--want you to start swimming against the
current, questioning character choices and narrative arcs.
For
this post, think of some occasion (ideally one you've experienced or
witnessed) in which a performance of some sort was "too real" and had to
have some kind of intervention/addition/change to interrupt the
illusion and make it not quite as problematically real.
Let
me give you an example or two of the kind of thing I'm thinking of.
First, as we noted in class, most straight play acting styles in the US
derive from Stanislavski, aiming at a naturalistic sense of the
character as a real, living person speaking, acting, and reacting
organically and spontaneously and not an actor reciting pre-written
lines and moving in pre-planned ways. In this sense, talking about a
"too real" performance seems odd. Can an actor be "too real" when
realism is the point?
Well, yes.
Although
on one level an actor should seem to be authentically living in the
imaginary circumstances of the play, on another simultaneous level the
actor has to be aware that she's an actor playing for a live audience in a theatre.
She must cheat out, project, enunciate, adhere to blocking, account for
technical elements, stick to the dialogue of the script, and do a
hundred other things that no actual person does in everyday life. Actors
who fail to remember to do these not-quite-real things, however, get
quick correction: "We can't see you!" "We can't hear you!" "You can't
just ad lib; the next cue depends on this line as written!" All of these
would be examples of interventions we make into stage realism,
alterations to the illusion that make the acting less "real" for the
sake of theatrical convention.
Another, not formally theatrical example of "too real" would be instances of parody or irony. A friend of mine, Kelly Howe,
writes about how performances like these run the risk of seeming too
real. (Witness, for example, occasions where a headline from the parody news site The Onion gets recirculated as authentic.) Without some kind of "wink" or nod to the audience--a breaking of the illusion of "this is real"--a parody might
be taken as the thing it seeks to make fun of. Online (and especially in cases where the parody skewers extreme conservative/religious views), this kind of
phenomenon is known as "Poe's Law," which in its original formulation goes like this: Absent
some kind of obvious signal, a parody of religious fundamentalism is
indistinguishable from an authentic expression of religious
fundamentalism.
Can you think of other occasions
where a performance of some sort was "too real"? What kind of
alteration/addition--a "wink" to the audience of sorts--was necessary to fix the "too real" performance (or
what kind of changes would have helped, if any)?
I'm so pleased with all the posts this round. Here's a digest:
Dharmik
mentions Colin Kaepernick’s kneeling for the national anthem (an act that
perhaps recalls and plays on Tim Tebow’s kneeling). I think that’s an excellent
example. Kaepernick apparently got the idea from a war vet, who suggested
kneeling as a respectful mode of dissent. In this light, kneeling is still a
gesture of homage—but with a slant, a marked difference from the norm. You
could certainly frame the huge debate/conversation/movement that sprang up in
response as a performative result of Kaepernick’s gesture. Dharmik also poses
some ethical questions about how we as actors rely on and play into gender
norms. Check it out.
Mark
relates an act of minor defacement of a stop-sign (from “STOP” to “STOP eating
animals”), one that with subsequent modifications became a mini-conversation
about social messages, vandalism, and parody. (As you’ll see the theme of
parody and ironic commentary is a running theme across many posts.) Fun stuff.
Also we learn that Mark has a thing against bran muffins.
Erica
shares an awesome story (with pics and videos) of her mom protesting
Vice-President Pence. She’s part of a protest where participants wear costumes
from the television adaptation of The Handmaid’s
Tale. A dystopian scenario of a near-future where fertile women are
enslaved and their reproductive freedom denied, Handmaid’s Tale gets invoked in this protest as both warning (this is what could happen here) and
denunciation (it better not happen here).
I mean, this isn’t LARP-ing, right? The protesters aren’t doing cosplay as
fans; they’re occupying and re-directing the signifier of “handmaiden” as a
loud, rambunctious (scholar Sara Ahmed would call it “willful”) protest. Awesome!
Mike
gives us a couple of different examples from pop culture—Dos Equis commercials
to Spaceballs, with Adam Sandler in
between. The Sandler, of course, is the movie I Now Pronounce You Chuck and Larry, where Sandler and Kevin James
play uber-straight guys who get married to reap the benefits of marriage—all while
maintaining the stereotypical straight male’s disgust/fear of being seen as gay
(or “like a woman,” really—there’s a famous saying to the effect of “homophobia
= misogyny in drag”). So—on the one hand this is a film that plays on gay
panic, i.e., the dramatic irony of “people think they’re gay—but they’re
totally not!!! HILARIOUS.” It likely does so while also insisting that it’s
really about tolerance (we’re just being
ironic, we have sympathetic gay characters, the protagonists learn to be accepting,
the comedy pokes fun at “real” homophobes, etc.). But in another way, the
plot also unintentionally echoes some critiques launched by various queer
theorists (including Butler) about what we gain and lose when “gay marriage”
becomes the be-all/end-all for LGBTQ political action. Legal marriage in the
USA confers a great many benefits (insurance, tax breaks, green cards, etc.).
That is, a great many life-enhancing benefits in the USA require that you be
married in order to access them easily. If I have a chronic illness but crappy
health insurance, why wouldn’t I want
to get fake-married to a willing spouse with excellent insurance and spousal
benefits? Or, more deeply, why should legal
marriage be a prerequisite for life-and-death things like health care,
citizenship, pension, and so forth? In presenting marriage as a cynical
ploy for benefits, in other words, the movie could be seen as criticizing why
the state sees fit to restrict multiple life-enhancing benefits to those who
get married. Chuck and Larry aren’t misusing
marriage. By turning marriage into an entry ticket for a world of benefits
(benefits that, in a better society, everyone would enjoy), the US has already
turned marriage into a cynical affair of elite privilege. At least—that’d be a
possible queer reading of the film.
Andréa
gives a cool, informed reading of a famous statue commemorating the “foot soldiers”
of the civil rights era. The subject of the photograph on whom the statue is
based objects to the way he and his image have been mythologized into something
he’s not. Andréa links this artistic mythologization to Suzan-Lori Park’s description
of her historical plays as “re-membering” history, making the past live and
breathe in the present. Yet no representation of the past—on stage, on the
page, or in art—is a perfect recreation. “History” is the story (the plot,
really) we tell about past events, not the past events themselves. That’s not
to say that there are some histories more accurate/reliable than others or that
the actual past doesn’t matter. But it is to point out that every historian or
artist who re-members the past has a filter operating about what to include,
what to exclude, what to focus on, and how to arrange/present it. The writing
of history (historiography) is a performative act. As such, it reiterates the
past in ways that alter slightly (or greatly) the “actual” past. Think about
that whenever you encounter a play about the past.
In a similar vein, I highly recommend Sarah’s
post about past and present moments of protest, oppression, and freedom in
Uganda and South Africa. She combines a reading of her relative’s nostalgia for
a past (even though, from a present POV that past was defined by oppressive/colonialist
dynamics) with a reading of some present-day students’ dissatisfaction with how
the present has failed to live up to past revolutionary promises. Sarah writes,
“Butler makes the observation that freedom is created and exists within the
moment of its manifestation – but this does not mean that a manifested freedom
is a successful one.” It’s complicated to try to summarize; read it for
yourself.
Lisa
solidifies the popularity of Spaceballs
among this MFA class, providing an in-depth reading of how Mel Brooks tweaks
various archetypes in George Lucas’s original. Given that Lucas intends many of
his images to invoke/recall specific historical/cultural realities, Brooks’s
tweaking necessarily tweaks those realities. Brooks, of course, is no stranger
to tweaking cultural/historical icons; witness Springtime for Hitler. Lisa makes me curious, though, about what it
might mean to bypass Star Wars iconography
in favor of Spaceballs when painting,
say, our current president as an evil overlord. Presenting Trump (or any
sitting President) as Darth Vader is one thing; presenting a president as Dark
Helmet is another.
Emily
relates a different kind of tweak—Monty Python’s tweak of the passion narrative
in The Life of Bryan. I hadn’t known
about the movie’s history or its subsequent controversy. Fascinating. If you’re
interested, scholar Henry Bial recently wrote a book called Playing God(available online from our library). There he chronicles the
surprisingly dicey history of Broadway plays that portray God as a character.
It used to be flat-out illegal to do so and still remains a vexed gesture. He
points out that, in presenting a God (or Jesus), you’re not just making a joke;
you’re making a theological statement. I wonder, is this can’t-help-but-be-bigger-than-you-intend
quality present in other kinds of representation?
Austin
references Borat, specifically the
part where Sacha Baron Cohen’s character attends a rodeo and sings—not “The
Star-Spangled Banner” but—what the movie portrays as the Kazakh national anthem
(a parody creation, of course, with lyrics about how much potassium the nation
produces and how clean its prostitutes are). The movie was widely praised (91%
on Rotten Tomatoes); most of the lawsuits against it by duped parties portrayed
in the film were dismissed. It’s worth noting, however, that in his pursuit of
a sly critique of USAmerican culture/views/values (including racism,
homophobia, and xenophobia), Cohen angered not just Americans but also actual
people from Kazakhstan. Now, I’m sure the creators of Borat did not intend any real offense. But, as we’ve discussed,
representation’s effects don’t always align with our best intentions. In 2012, a
Kazakh woman, Mariya
Dmitriyenko, won the Amir of Kuwait International Shooting Grand Prix (a
sports shooting event). Standing on the platform during the ceremony, she was dismayed
to hear not her country’s anthem but the Borat
parody (which the event’s organizers had accidentally downloaded). The
ceremony was restaged with the right anthem. As we’ve seen with the other
parodic tweaks, irony’s a tricky animal. It always runs the risk of being
missed, taken at face value rather than as a tongue-in-cheek gesture.
That's it for this week! Keep the posts and comments comin'.
We read about a performative act as an expression that does or accomplishes something beyond describing or referring to something else.
We read about how performative utterances aren't true or false but felicitous or infelicitous--they work or they don't work based on the context, the person uttering it, etc.
We read, finally, about how performative acts--the conscious and
unconscious habits and actions we do every day--can help to create a
sense of self, a sense of gender, a sense of identity. From "It's a
girl! Let's buy pink" to "Ladies don't sit like that" to "You make me
feel like a natural woman"--our sense of who we are (masculine,
feminine, queer, straight, bi, trans-, cis-, Methodist, Hindu, Atheist,
Vegan, ginger, whatever) comes from a lifetime of repeated acts that
performatively consolidate a sense of gender identity and sexuality.
But,
Butler says, if identity is based on performances, then that opens the
possibility that we may perform differently than expected. We can change
or alter (or, to use the verb form, we can queer) performative acts in ways that undermine or subvert how they're "supposed" to be performed. She links this performing-differently to performances of citizenship, such as the instance of protesters singing the USAmerican national anthem in Spanish.
For
this week's post, I want you to describe or link to an example of
someone tweaking a performative act or utterance to mean/do something
other than it's originally supposed to. If I pledge allegiance to the
American flag, that's one thing (I pledge allegiance by reciting the words, "I pledge allegiance..."). If I recite that pledge, however, as I salute--say--the flag of the evil Galactic Empire from Star Wars--then
I'm doing something else, perhaps suggesting that the U.S. is like the
Galactic Empire (note: I'm just using an example here, not actually
making that suggestion. I could just as easily use the flag of Equestria from My Little Pony: Friendship is Magic).
Something similar happens if I tweak (queer?) a famously patriotic action captured in art, like Raising the Flag on Iwo Jima
(as the pics I've included here do). Note how these tweaks could be
taken in a number of ways: funny, clever, disrespectful, or offensive.
Aside from your standard "reflect/discuss stuff from this week," give
me the example of a performative act/utterance intentionally performed
to mean something else. Then explain your example. Reflect on if/how
that intentional misperformance could be interpreted in contradictory
ways.
Thanks for your amazing posts! There’s a lot here, so let
me get to it.
Andréa
seizes on the notion that performance is “scripted” behavior. Chatting with a
friend, drinking some water, and petting a dog, she wonders what script if any
they and the dog are performing. States (I think it’s him?—I’ll need to check)
somewhere mentions that it’s tricky to describe pets and children as
performing. Onstage (as I’m sure you all know), most pets and very young
children (e.g., toddlers, infants) draw focus. They are, semiotically speaking,
disruptions. Why? States guesses it’s because they are only, obviously themselves.
They cannot engage in mimetic behavior (at least, not at the level dictated by formal
stage conventions). At some level, the audience knows that they’re out of control. We hope the kid will
behave; we hope the dog will go through its assigned tricks. But, audiences realize,
there’s no guarantee this will be the case. The same kind of out-of-control
fascination occurs with elements like fire or water on stage. They’re
unpredictable—unscriptable—in ways that put pressure on the other elements on
stage. Cool stuff, really. For your enjoyment: here’s MarinaAbramovic drinking water.
Emily,
in grappling with the notion that everything is performance, reminds me of a
helpful distinction Schechner makes in the “What is Performance” optional
reading I gave you. Namely, Schechner talks about two different conversations
or avenues of inquiry we can take. We can, on the one hand, talk about
something (an event, a phenomenon) like it is
(unquestionably is) performance. Alternately, we can talk about something as (“as if it were”)performance. Performance, in other words, can be a conceptual box
into which we put certain kinds of events. Or it can be a lens that we can peer
through to examine events in a new light (the light of “what if we looked at
this as a performance?”). The is/as distinction takes some of the pressure off
of our having to have utterly certain definitions. Emily also distinguishes
sports from performance by invoking the notion of the fictitious. Theatrical
performances are fictitious; sports are real. It’s a rule of thumb that makes
sense, but of course I’m going to throw a monkeywrench into the gears. The term
fiction, after all, doesn’t mean untrue or without substance or consequence; it just means manufactured—crafted by someone. In this
sense, football is both real (bones get broken, traumatic brain injuries
happen, teams win and lose) and fictitious. Football is, in some sense, an
arbitrary set rules for behavior that are “real” only because everyone involved
consents to treat them seriously, suspending their disbelief in the ostensible
silliness of the endeavor. (Of course, one can use that description for just
about any human enterprise. Can you think of any exceptions?)
Sarah
gives us a fascinating metaphor of theatre and performance as, respectively,
the upper and middle classes of a kingdom. (What, I wonder, would the lower
classes be? Porn acting? Mime? Prop comedy?) Theatre, she offers, operates as “a
series of previously definedactions guided by an undisputed manual.” Performance, on the
other hand, is “continuously definedbehavior which seeks to dispute this single standard of operation.” Rather
quickly, though, Sarah problematizes this distinction, pointing out how the boundaries
between these two realms defines a zone of conflict. Performance constantly
drifts into standardized, conventional practice; theatre attempts to push its
boundaries by incorporating performance elements. The description of this
battle—which Sarah frames as being vital to the kingdom’s survival—is fascinating.
Osi
helpfully brings in Schechner’s distinction between “make-believe” and “make-belief”
performance. Some kinds of performance (conventional theatre, LARPing, children
playing) aim to create a space of “make-believe,” where participants conjoin
imaginations to create and sustain a “what if” world or scenario. Other kinds
of performance are “make-belief”—structured and even scripted, to be sure, but
taken seriously and not separated from the rest of life in terms of consequence
and seriousness. The presidency is Schechner’s example here. Various kinds of
cultural and religious ritual might fit here. As Osi points out, these two
realms have a lot of overlap. Can you think of times where you thought you were
participating in one realm (make-belief/make-believe) only to end up in the
other?
Austin
provides a nice review of the elements of performance outlined by Carlson
before turning to the sports/theatre distinction. For Austin, the crucial
distinction is that in a sporting event, the participants aren’t clear on the conclusion
in the same way that actors in a play are. (Of course, there are plays such as The Mystery of Edwin Drood that defy
this convention.) Austin ends with an intriguing question about professional
wrestling, a practice that challenges a lot of our conversations about theatre
versus sports. (Neal Hebert, a recent PhD graduate of ours, wrote his
dissertation on professional wrestling. He knows a lot about it.)
Two notions from Mike’s
post catch my attention. First, he suggests a distinction between theatre and theater. The -re describes the craft/discipline; the -er describes
the physical space. This reminds me of one of the first practical lessons I got
in theatre, way back during a production of Chess(the other ABBA musical) at the Shawnee (Oklahoma)
Little Theatre. I was a little high school junior, playing five or six
different ensemble parts, and an older (like, 22 years old) theatre major from
Oklahoma Baptist University, who was playing a bigger role, schooled me on
pronunciation and syllabic emphasis. THEE-a-ter, she counseled, was this thing
we’re doing, whereas the-A-ter was that place you go to watch movies. It was
clear from her manner which one was preferable. In my mind, I’ve always pasted
those pronunciations on the two different spellings. The other idea Mike brings
up is that of obligatory performances, or performances under stress. Mike
refers to occasions where you have to make an excuse to someone—a parent, a
spouse, a teacher—and you engage in some “acrobatic” storytelling (even if you’re
not, strictly speaking, lying). We’ll
be talking more about performances under stress later in the semester.
Mark
mentions a kind of performance-under-stress: his son’s request to play video
games. As Mark points out, all performances depend upon contexts for their
significance and meaning. Theatre’s only real distinction from performance,
ultimately, is the standardized, conventional nature of its particular context.
(Note how vital contexts are for performative acts, as well.) Of course, when
there’s a lack of agreement or confusion about context, things can go awry See
this example from The Naked Gun.
Can you think of real-world occasions where this kind of
confusion has occurred?
Erica
relates her experience of devising and performing her “Vocal History”
assignment in (Stacy’s?) class, relating the various different kinds of voice
she’s developed for different sets of contexts and audiences. It’s a cool
example of the “not-me” and “not-not-me” and of how differential pressures can
move us (oblige us?) to innovate our personal performances. Erica writes, “I
cannot think of a moment in my life when I have been truly alone and had the
same sense of performance as I have had in the instances I mentioned above.”
This makes me wonder if and how we perform when we think we’re alone. Are we
ever really separated from performance contexts, from the visible and invisible
pressures that impel us to perform? When, in other words, might we be not performing? When might we be “just
me”?
In her post, Lisa
centers us on questions of purpose: what’s performance/theatre for? The purpose, as she states, will
dictate our choices. She’s fascinated by occasions where intention and
reception (or, as she puts it, “expectation and fruition”) differ. There’s
always a risk with performance, right? One theatre scholar, Peggy Phelan (in
her amazing book Unmarked: The Politics of Performance),
reminds us that representation (and thus performance) follows two laws: “(i) it
always conveys more than it intends, and (ii) it is never totalizing” (2). There’s
a surplus and a deficit in every act of representation, a little wiggle room of
both “I didn’t mean that” and “but I
thought that’s what I just said.”
This wiggle room can be a source of frustration (as when your audience just
doesn’t get it, or when—worse—they see something offensive/bad in your
performance that you didn’t intend at all). But it can also be a source of
energy and joy. It’s the potential for the new/unexpected that makes representation/performance/theatre
so dynamic. It’s this never-quite-exact Murphy’s Law of representation that
gives theorists like Judith Butler hope. We’ll talk more about this later in
class.
In his musings on the theatre/sports distinction, Dharmik
mentions that theatre often intends to teach as well as entertain. There’s a
venerable history in western theatre of theorists and practitioners (starting
at least with Horace) saying
that theatre’s twin purposes are “to teach and to please.” There have been
variations on this throughout history (e.g., Antonio Minturno arguing,
“teach, please, and persuade”; Lodovico Castelvetro
saying “just entertain”). As a bit of arts advocacy, though, “teach and please”
isn’t bad, is it? Would you say that theatre follows those aims? Should it? Dharmik
also mentions the kind of personas that athletes often have. That’s a
fascinating idea, the persona. How is a persona
different than or similar to a character?
Can you think of examples where the two blur into each other (off the top of my
head: Mr. Rogers, Bill Nye the Science Guy, Mr. T)?
That’s all my thinks for now. Feel free to
comment/elaborate either here or on your own (or others’) blogs. Do read/comment
on each other’s blogs, and look for the prompt for Post 2 soon!